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Dimensions of Reliability 
in Phenomenal Judgment 
Abstract: Eric Schwitzgebel (2011) argues that phenomenal judg-
ments are in general less reliable than perceptual judgments. This 
paper distinguishes two versions of this unreliability thesis. The 
process unreliability thesis says that unreliability in phenomenal judg-
ments is due to faulty domain-specific mechanisms involved in pro-
ducing these judgments, whereas the statistical unreliability thesis 
says that it is simply a matter of higher numbers of errors. Against the 
process unreliability thesis, I argue that the main errors and limita-
tions in making phenomenal judgments can be accounted for by 
domain-general factors: attention, working memory limits, and con-
ceptualization. As these factors are shared with the production of 
perceptual judgments, errors in phenomenal judgments are not due to 
faulty domain-specific processes. Furthermore, this account defends 
phenomenal judgments against general scepticism by providing 
criteria for distinguishing between reliable and unreliable phenom-
enal judgments. 
1. Introduction 
Eric Schwitzgebel (2011) claims that introspective judgments about 
conscious experience are generally unreliable, and are far less reliable 
than perceptual judgments about the world. Some of the cases 
                                                          
1  Portions of this work were completed while the author was a visiting scholar at the 
Department of Philosophy, Ohio State University (USA). 
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Schwitzgebel presents against reliability include the failure to 
distinguish details about our own phenomenology, such as the basic 
details of visual imagery (Chapter 3). In Chapter 7, he highlights the 
uncertainty we have about the character and location of our emotions 
and that sometimes we may not notice our emotions at all such as 
feelings of grumpiness. Another case is that we tend to fail to notice 
broad features of our visual experience such as the fact that it is not 
clear all the way to the edges. Rather, there is only a small central 
region of clarity. Philosophers also disagree about what visual patterns 
manifest when one’s eyes are closed (ibid., Chapter 8). 
Based upon the weight of such problem cases, Schwitzgebel draws 
the pessimistic conclusion that naïve introspection2 is ‘faulty, untrust-
worthy, and misleading — not just sometimes a little mistaken, but 
frequently and massively mistaken’ (ibid., p. 129). More specifically 
Schwitzgebel makes the comparative claim that phenomenal judg-
ments are in general far less reliable than perceptual judgments. He 
holds, ‘Descartes, I think, had it quite backward when he said the 
mind — including especially current conscious experience — was 
better known than the outside world’ (ibid., p. 136) and ‘Our judge-
ments about the world tend to drive our judgements about our experi-
ence. Properly so, since the former are the more secure’ (ibid., p. 137). 
It is this comparative claim that I will be focusing on here. 
What does Schwitzgebel’s comparative pessimistic thesis amount 
to? We can distinguish between two pessimistic theses: 
 The Process Unreliability Thesis: Errors in the formation of 
phenomenal judgments are due to factors specific to the forma-
tion of phenomenal judgments. 
 The Statistical Unreliability Thesis: Phenomenal judgments are 
less reliable  than perceptual judgments overall in terms of 
proportion of errors. 
Here I will argue against the process unreliability interpretation of 
introspective pessimism by showing how a domain-general frame-
work can account for the main introspective errors and limitations. My 
alternative claim will be: 
                                                          
2  Naïve introspection involves phenomenal judgments which have not been supplemented 
by training or first-person methods. These are the type of phenomenal judgments I will 
focus on in this paper. In what follows I drop the term ‘naïve’ and simply refer to 
phenomenal judgments. 
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 The Domain-General Thesis: Errors and limitations in the forma-
tion of phenomenal judgments are due to factors that are domain-
general in the sense that they are shared with the formation of 
perceptual judgments. 
The domain-general thesis is compatible with a statistical version of 
the comparative pessimistic thesis. I will not be arguing against the 
statistical unreliability thesis here. 
It is not clear in Schwitzgebel (2008; 2011) which thesis the prob-
lem cases are meant to provide evidence for. That it is the statistical 
unreliability thesis is implicit in Schwitzgebel (2012) where he argues 
for a domain-general account of introspection. The distinction 
between process unreliability and statistical unreliability needs to be 
made explicit, as this has important consequences for questions about 
the reliability of phenomenal judgments. In particular, if the process 
unreliability thesis is true, then the errors are likely to infect intro-
spection alone. If the alternative domain-general thesis is true, then 
perceptual judgments will be prone to the very same errors as 
phenomenal judgments. 
I propose that the production of phenomenal judgments involves a 
number of domain-general factors such as attention, working memory, 
and conceptualization. In the domain-general framework developed 
here attention selects experienced features or objects,3 and activates/ 
forms concepts in working memory which produce (or perhaps partly 
constitute) judgments about the experience. 
Previous authors have suggested that attentional and conceptual pro-
cesses can account for many introspective processes (Bayne and 
Spener, 2010; Block, 2007; Carruthers, 2011; Engelburt and 
Carruthers, 2010; Hill, 2011; Prinz, 2004; Schwitzgebel, 2012; Watzl 
and Wu, 2012), with a central role for domain-general processes 
(Carruthers, 2011; Prinz, 2004; Schwitzgebel, 2012). It remains 
unclear, however, whether such explanations are capable of account-
ing for most errors and limitations in making phenomenal judgments. 
The best defence of the reliability of introspection may be to give up 
on a separate introspective process altogether, and rather just talk of 
phenomenal judgments that involve the same domain-general 
                                                          
3  I am neutral here as to whether experience is transparent such that the features and 
objects which engage attention are only ever external (perhaps represented) properties 
and objects (Harman, 1990; Tye, 1995; 2000), or whether properties of experience can 
(at least sometimes) be directly attended (Block, 1996; Kind, 2003). 
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processes as perceptual and rational judgments. One may well think 
that a domain-general account puts pressure on the need to posit a 
special domain-specific self-monitoring mechanism (Armstrong, 
1968; Goldman, 2006; Lycan, 1996; Nichols and Stich, 2003). Pre-
vious authors use a domain-general account to motivate scepticism 
about the existence of a special introspective process (Carruthers, 
2011; Prinz, 2004; Schwitzgebel, 2012). However, I do not pursue this 
question here. The aim of the paper will not be to assess arguments for 
and against particular philosophical theories of introspection. Rather, 
here I focus upon discussing empirical evidence for and against the 
domain-general thesis. Furthermore, a domain-general account of 
errors is consistent with the existence of domain-specific introspective 
processes, as long as these are not strongly modular and hence pre-
clude a role of domain-general processes in producing phenomenal 
judgments. 
Here I attempt to give a scientifically informed account of domain-
general processes that could plausibly account for the major classes of 
introspective errors and limitations. Accounting for all errors is 
obviously beyond the scope of a single paper. The aim here is rather to 
develop a general framework which could in principle account for 
most of the introspective errors and limitations. This project should 
also be of general interest to cognitive scientists as the assumption is 
that the same processes are also involved in making conscious judg-
ments in general, and will hence be involved in most psychological 
tasks ranging from perceptual judgment to moral judgment, to 
mathematical calculation. 
As an empirical hypothesis I cannot claim to establish the necessary 
truth of the domain-general thesis. Evidence which undermines the 
hypothesis can be uncovered at any time. Rather, my claim is that 
there is currently enough supporting evidence to make the thesis more 
sufficiently probable than the process unreliability thesis. 
The aim of the paper will not be to argue for an exhaustive 
theoretical account of every problem case considered here, thus 
deciding whether it is definitely an error or not. Rather, the goal is to 
argue for the disjunction: problem cases for phenomenal judgments 
either do not count as errors or if they do count as errors then they can 
be accounted for by domain-general factors. 
The plan for the paper is as follows: in Section 2, I discuss the 
motivation for using a domain-general approach as a response to intro-
spective scepticism. In Section 3, I characterize the difference 
between phenomenal and perceptual judgments. In Sections 4, 5, and 
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6, I investigate in detail how domain-general factors (respectively, 
attention, working memory, and conceptualization) can account for 
problem cases for phenomenal judgments. I discuss cognitive 
dissociations and their challenge to a domain-general framework in 
Section 7. In Section 8, I argue against general scepticism towards 
phenomenal judgments. In Section 9, I conclude by summarizing the 
case for the domain-general thesis. 
2. Background Motivations 
That phenomenal judgments are generally untrustworthy (or at least 
exhibit very high levels of unreliability) are motivations for Daniel 
Dennett’s (1991; 2001a) rejection of first-person methods and in 
Schwitzgebel taking a pessimistic position towards the possibility of 
reliable methods (Hurlbert and Schwitzgebel, 2007; Schwitzgebel, 
2011, pp. 129, 167, though see Chapter 4). Philosophers, in conversa-
tion with me, have also professed pessimism about first-person 
methods on the basis of Schwitzgebel’s problem cases, presumably 
because they interpret them as establishing the general untrustworthi-
ness of introspection. 
One motivation for the paper is to provide an initial defence of the 
possibility of reliable first-person methods as part of a science of 
consciousness.4 That there can be reliable first-person methods is 
compatible with holding that naïve introspection is statistically less 
reliable than perceptual judgments. Hence the truth or falsity of the 
statistical unreliability thesis is not a concern from the point of view 
of a researcher in the science of consciousness. This seemed to be the 
position held by Titchener (Schwitzgebel, 2011, Chapter 5). 
If Schwitzgebel’s cases are taken as establishing that all phenom-
enal judgments are untrustworthy — ‘introspective scepticism’ 
(Bayne and Spener, 2010) — then this result arguably undermines the 
possibility of reliable first-person methods. This may be the case 
because phenomenal judgments stem from pervasively faulty pro-
cesses. Thus no amount of training nor use of methods would be 
expected to improve them. 
Introspective scepticism also presents a danger to the many every-
day phenomenal judgments that are prima facie highly reliable: for 
                                                          
4  For examples of previous defences of the use of introspection in science, see Goldman 
(2004) and Hatfield (2009, Chapter 16), and Kriegel (2013). 
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example, judging that I feel hungry, feel an intense toothache, foveal 
colour judgments, and similarity judgments such as orange seems 
more similar to yellow than to blue. As Bayne and Spener (2010, p. 8) 
point out, it seems perverse to doubt the reliability of these phenom-
enal judgments. No amount of philosophical argument will convince 
someone, for example, that they should doubt the fact that they are 
experiencing a severe toothache. Even Schwitzgebel (2011, p. 139) 
pulls back from distrusting these judgments, yet without a positive 
reason for trusting these judgments general introspective scepticism 
looms as threat. 
Introspective scepticism based upon faulty processes can be under-
mined (or at least rendered unattractive) by showing that errors in 
phenomenal judgments stem from domain-general processes. How-
ever, if the number of errors was high enough then this could still 
provide a reason for introspective scepticism. I respond to this further 
threat in Section 8. 
3. Phenomenal Judgments 
and Perceptual Judgments 
The term ‘introspection’ originates from ordinary language, and 
suggests some sort of ‘inner looking’ as opposed to perception or 
‘outer looking’. However, I have doubts that there is a substantially 
separate faculty of introspection apart from those processes which 
produce perceptual and intellectual judgments. So as to remain neutral 
about the underlying processes, following Chalmers (1996, pp. 173–
6), I generally use the term ‘phenomenal judgment’ rather than 
introspection. 
For the purposes of this paper, a ‘phenomenal judgment’ is a judg-
ment about one’s current phenomenology, formed using attentional 
resources, on the basis of (or intended to be on the basis of) current 
relevant experience.5 This includes judgments about thoughts, emo-
                                                          
5  The standard view of the basing relation is that it is a type of causal relation between the 
reason for having the belief (here the experience) and the belief (Korcz, 2010). An alter-
native to a causal relation is a constitutive relation, for instance if the concept of ‘red’ is 
partly constituted by a presently experienced phenomenal character of red. This direct 
phenomenal concept can in turn be part of a direct phenomenal belief such as ‘the apple 
looks red’ (Chalmers, 2010). Though this constitutive relation would only apply to a 
small set of beliefs. This is not the place to defend a theory of the basing relation. It 
should be sufficient for current purposes if the reader understands ‘basing’ as a form of 
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tions, pain, mental imagery, and sensory experiences (for example, 
how things seem, look, appear, feel). Some examples of judgments 
about experience are ‘the rose looks red’, ‘the stove feels hot’, ‘the 
town looks far away’. Thus one may judge that ‘the stove feels hot’ on 
the basis of the stove feeling hot. I say ‘intended to be on the basis of’ 
because I want to allow that one could base their judgment upon the 
wrong experience such as the stove feeling cold. Otherwise the possi-
bility of erroneous phenomenal judgments may be ruled out by defi-
nition. I say ‘relevant experience’ because that the stove feels hot 
should not be based upon the stove looking hot, but rather upon the 
stove feeling hot. 
The relevant class of ‘perceptual judgment’ are judgments about 
objects, events, and properties of the world, formed using attentional 
resources, on the basis of (or intended to be on the basis of) current 
relevant conscious perception. For example, ‘the rose is red’, ‘the 
stove is hot’, and ‘the town is far away’. Thus one may judge that ‘the 
stove is hot’ on the basis of the stove feeling hot (perhaps ‘looking 
hot’ also counts, if HOTNESS is a property of visual experience). How-
ever, for the purposes of this paper judging that ‘the stove is hot’ on 
the basis of seeing smoke coming from the chimney would not count, 
as the conscious perception does not include the stove and HOTNESS, 
but rather these are derived by inference from a conscious perception. 
Schwitzgebel (2012, pp. 34–5) points out that it is easy to confuse 
judgments about sensory experience and properties of the world. For 
example, in a psychophysics experiment one may make repeated judg-
ments about colour experience (the colour things look to have). In this 
case it is easy to slip into making a judgment about properties of the 
world (e.g. about the stimuli on the screen). Thus a judgment that the 
rose ‘looks red’ and ‘is red’ are often interchangeable in ordinary 
circumstances. 
Importantly for present purposes, even though confusion can 
happen, phenomenal and perceptual judgments are nevertheless con-
ceptually distinct. With enough effort or when I think an illusion may 
be involved, ‘looks red’ and ‘is red’ are sharply distinguishable. When 
I look at a white rose through red tinted glasses I may judge that ‘the 
rose looks pink’ but, having seen it without the glasses, nevertheless 
also believe that ‘the rose is actually white’. 
                                                                                                                  
causal relation or constitutive relation between the reason for the belief (i.e. experience) 
and the belief. 
Co
py
rig
ht
 (c
) Im
pri
nt 
Ac
ad
em
ic 
20
16
Fo
r p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y 
-- 
no
t f
or
 re
pr
od
uc
tio
n
 108 B.J.  RAMM 
4. Attention 
In the next three sections I discuss how errors and limitations in 
making phenomenal judgments can be accounted for by domain-
general factors. I discuss attention in this section. 
Inattention is responsible for errors in both perceptual and phenom-
enal judgments. The effect of failing to attend in making judgments 
about the world is dramatically evident in studies of inattentional 
blindness in which subjects fail to notice unexpected events such as a 
gorilla walking through a basketball game when their attention is 
distracted (Simons and Chabris, 1999: see also, Mack and Rock, 1998; 
Most et al., 2005; Simons, 2000). 
An introspective case that is plausibly explained by inattention is 
my failure to notice the degree of acuity of my visual field. 
Schwitzgebel (2011) and Dennett (1991, pp. 53–4, 68; 2001b; 2002) 
point out that many people believe that their visual field is clear all the 
way to the edges, whereas objects in the periphery actually appear 
indistinct and blurry. Furthermore there is only a small central region 
of clarity of two degrees, whereas most would judge it to be a large 
window of clarity. That subjects possess a false belief about their 
visual field is evidenced by the surprise people express upon being 
shown the low resolution for shapes and colours of peripheral vision 
(Dennett, 1991, p. 68; 2001b). 
This case seems to be at least in part a failure in attentional 
orienting, in particular a failure to attend to that location while keep-
ing their eyes fixated (Schwitzgebel, 2011; Engleburt and Carruthers, 
2010; Hill, 2011; Waltz and Wu, 2012). It is has also been previously 
argued that subjects’ belief in a large window of clarity is due to them 
making a judgment about dynamic vision in contrast to gaze-fixed 
vision (see Hill, 2011, p. 27; Engelburt and Carruthers, 2010, p. 251). 
In normal vision, the eyes perform a saccade a few times a second 
(e.g. Land, 1999), which the visual system combines into a single 
visual scene. We would not expect subjects to be aware of information 
at such short durations any more than we would expect them to see the 
images of a film as static rather than moving, or a spinning flame on 
the end of a pole as a point of light rather than a circle of flame. 
Dennett’s and Schwitzgebel’s subjects were only mistaken, then, if 
their beliefs were about fixed-gaze vision. If their belief in a large 
window of clarity referred to typical, dynamic vision, then they (and 
most of us) were correct after all. 
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Interestingly, both Schwitzgebel and Dennett provide first-person 
methods for keeping one’s eyes fixated while orienting attention to the 
periphery. An example would be focusing on one’s thumbnail held at 
arm’s length while attending to peripheral vision (Hill, 2011, p. 27). 
Upon doing this, the lack of acuity becomes highly evident. This 
shows that, while naïve first-person observations often fail, more 
sophisticated first-person techniques can succeed. 
Another challenge to the reliability of first-person judgments is the 
apparent fact that I often fail to notice some of my experiences, such 
as being angry, sad, depressed, or anxious. Schwitzgebel (2011, pp. 
122–3) gives the case of my partner mentioning that I seem to be 
grumpy about doing the dishes. I carefully reflect on this and deny 
that I am feeling grumpy. But from the look on my face, and the way I 
bang the dishes about, it is evident that I am grumpy. Perhaps upon 
further reflection I do actually detect feelings of grumpiness. It seems 
that my initial judgment was mistaken. Even though I attempt to care-
fully reflect, it is likely that the anger will cause me to be disposed to 
reject the accusation that I am grumpy without attending sufficiently 
carefully. If I am repressing the emotion then I may be disposed (have 
an attentional bias) to attend briefly to the emotion and then rapidly 
disengage attention, hence inhibiting explicit recognition of its 
presence (Derakshan, Eysenck and Myers, 2007). 
Alternatively no error may have occurred at all. Other possibilities 
are that the emotion did not reach consciousness, or was merely 
dispositional, or perhaps I did not really feel grumpy at T1, but only 
felt so after the fact when my partner suggested that I am grumpy. 
Also even if I retrospectively recall that I did seem to feel grumpy at 
the time, my initial judgment may still be correct, as this may be a 
false memory created by the suggestion that I am grumpy. 
Even if the above explanations of errors are correct, it does not 
follow that the attention used in making phenomenal judgments is a 
domain-general faculty. Perhaps there is a special faculty of ‘intro-
spective attention’ that is responsible for these errors. For examples of 
the use of this term see Bayne and Spener (2010, p. 12), Hohwy 
(2011, p. 270), Schwitzgebel (2011, pp. 126, 175). 
A reason for rejecting this hypothesis is the observation that 
attending to visual images, pains, thoughts, and emotions can distract 
someone from making correct perceptual judgments and vice versa. If 
there is a separate introspective attention then I should be able to fully 
attend to my thoughts and the world simultaneously without any inter-
ference. For example, on this view it is difficult to account for why I 
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am more likely to walk into street poles when I am absorbed in my 
thoughts. This strongly suggests that in attending to my thoughts I was 
withdrawing attention from the world. 
There is also evidence for a single attentional mechanism in the 
domains of emotion and pain. For example, it has been found that felt 
pain is reduced when attention is distracted (e.g. Buhle and Wager, 
2010; Legrain et al., 2009) and high working memory load reduces 
negative affective responses to negative images (Schmeichel, 
Volokhov and Demaree, 2008; Van Dillen and Koole, 2007) and 
reduces attentional capture by pain (Legrain et al., 2011). The best 
explanation of these findings seems to be that judgments about emo-
tions and pains (so-called introspections) utilize the same attentional 
system. 
Of course, there are exceptions when I do not seem to be interfered 
with by attending to multiple domains, for instance when attending to 
my thoughts or feelings and the traffic as I am driving. Musing that I 
feel happy today does not always seem to interfere with my ability to 
drive efficiently. However, such cases do not necessitate that there are 
domain-specific attentional mechanisms, as they can be explained by 
rapid switches of attention between the two activities, or by one of the 
activities continuing ‘on autopilot’ while the other consumes my 
attention. 
Furthermore, on a resources theory, attention is a single limited 
resource that can be spread between multiple domains. On this view 
significant interference only occurs when attentional resources are 
exhausted. For example, it has been found that talking on a hands-free 
cell phone while driving significantly reduces driving performance 
even though the two activities rely upon different sensory modalities 
(Strayer and Johnston, 2001). Finally, while there is empirical 
evidence in favour of a single domain-general selection process, I am 
unaware of any empirical research which supports the existence of a 
special introspective attentional mechanism. 
5. Working Memory Limitations 
What about unreliability in judging aspects of experience that I am in 
fact currently attending to, such as thoughts and emotions? My claim 
here is that the limitations of working memory explain the difficulty 
of judging features of complex and dynamic events such as emotions 
and much of our mental imagery. 
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Working memory is usually thought to have a central capacity-
limited component or an upper limit in processing resources (e.g. 
Baddeley, 2000; 2003; Cowan, 2001; Just and Carpenter, 1992; 
Halford, Wilson and Phillips, 1998), and time-limited short-term 
memory stores (e.g. phonological, visual-spatial) which are subject to 
decay and interference. Some theorists include a short-term store for 
affective information (Mikels et al., 2008). I suggest that limits in 
judging complex phenomena stem from an upper limit to the number 
of concepts that can be formed/activated at any one time in working 
memory (Block, 2007, pp. 487–9).6 Furthermore, the unreliability in 
judging dynamic phenomena stems from the failure to maintain con-
cepts active in working memory. 
5.1. Complexity and the Capacity Limits of Working Memory 
Unsurprisingly in vision and other modalities, when phenomena are 
highly complex, it is more difficult to categorize all of their properties. 
For instance, it is difficult to report all of the items in a complex 
scene. This can be explained by the limits of working memory. Cowan 
(2001) presents a large amount of experimental evidence that there is 
a capacity limit to working memory of approximately four items 
(chunks). For example, there is a limit of approximately four items in 
visual working memory (Luck and Vogel, 1997), recall of verbal 
material (Broadbent, 1975), in the discrimination of complex aromas 
(Laing and Francis, 1989), and in recalling items from visual iconic 
memory (Sperling, 1960). That a capacity limit of four holds between 
so many domains, including at least some paradigmatically intro-
spective processes, suggests a single central capacity limit. 
An alternative interpretation is to posit that there are modality-
specific resources such as separate capacities for visual and auditory 
information rather than a central attentional resource (Wickens, 1984; 
2002). However, importantly Saults and Cowan (2007) found that for 
a simultaneously presented visual and auditory array recall was 
limited to 3–4 items, thus providing evidence for a single capacity 
limit which goes across sensory modalities. This finding is difficult to 
account for by a multiple capacities view. 
                                                          
6  Ramm and Halford (2012) provide evidence that conceptual combination draws upon 
capacity-limited processing resources, and thus that new concepts are formed in 
working memory. 
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As discussed above, research in emotion and pain provides some 
evidence for the domain-general hypothesis. There has been far more 
extensive research in visual imagery and iconic memory, and hence 
more evidence supporting the hypothesis that these draw upon the 
same capacity-limited resources as visual perception. For example, it 
has been found that mental imagery is associated with many of the 
same brain areas as high-level visual perception (Ishai and Sagi, 1995; 
Kosslyn, Ganis and Thompson, 2001; Kosslyn, Thompson and Alpert, 
1997), and so it is plausible that mental imagery relies upon the same 
capacity limits as visual perception. It has also been found that it takes 
longer to generate a more complex imagined letter or shape than a 
simple one (Bruyer and Scailquin, 1998; Kossyln, 1980; Dror and 
Kosslyn, 1994). Furthermore, the generation and rotation of images is 
interfered with more by random letter generation (a task that requires 
capacity-limited resources) than articulatory suppression (which is 
considered to be a relatively automatic process) (Bruyer and 
Scailquin, 1998). 
The capacity limits in extracting information from experiences also 
accounts for the classic problem case of why I do not know how many 
spots are on an imagined speckled hen. Studies on subitizing (auto-
matic recognition of number) show a limit of approximately four in 
subitizing items in briefly viewed displays (Mandler and Shebo, 1982; 
Trick and Pylyshyn, 1994) and after-images (Atkinson, Campbell and 
Francis, 1976; Simon and Vaisnavi, 1996). Again, whilst such 
evidence shows that knowledge of experience is not infallible, neither 
in such cases is there a reason to believe that it is more fallible than 
perceptual knowledge in similar cases. Judging the number of spots on 
a briefly perceived speckled hen is just as difficult as judging the 
number of spots on an imagined hen (although the instability of 
mental images probably contributes an additional source of errors/ 
limits). 
The evidence suggests, then, a capacity limit to making phenomenal 
judgments. Importantly, this limit applies to both phenomenal and 
perceptual judgments (see also Hill, 2011, pp. 28–31). This hypothesis 
also partly explains the variability in subjects’ reports regarding the 
patterns seen when one’s eyes are closed. As these visual patterns are 
both complex and dynamic, inaccuracy and variability would be 
expected in reports. This is no different from the fact that we would 
not expect subjects to give a perfectly accurate account of the colours 
and patterns of a fireworks display. When the ‘inner light show’ and 
‘outer light show’ share the same degree of complexity one would 
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expect both to lead to similar levels of inaccuracy in reports. One may 
also expect more individual variability in eyes-closed patterns than 
fireworks, due to differences in lighting conditions, and perhaps even 
differences in visual systems. 
Of course, this cannot be the whole story. It is odd for instance that 
historically Goethe, Purkinje, Muller, and Helmholtz all report 
‘wandering cloudy stripes’, but such descriptions disappear after the 
early nineteenth century (Schwitzgebel, 2011, pp. 142–9). It seems 
like theory must have been driving these descriptions, in particular 
influence from reading previous authors such as Purkinje. 
5.2. Dynamicity and the Failure to Maintain Activation of 
Concepts 
If a phenomenon is rapidly changing over time this adds further diffi-
culties to making a phenomenal judgment. In fact, emotions, thoughts, 
and pains seem to be more like sounds in their dynamically changing 
character. Visual imagery also seems to be unstable, which can be 
considered a form of dynamicity. Schwitzgebel asks, what are the 
gross and fine features of emotion and pain? We seem to be reliable at 
identifying broad features of emotions, pleasures, and pains such as 
intensity, pleasantness, unpleasantness, and often use dynamic terms 
such as surging, crescendo, fading, etc. (Lambie and Marcel, 2002, p. 
230). 
I propose here that limitations in making phenomenal judgments 
about dynamic experiences are due to failures in retaining concepts 
active in short-term memory. Suppose that there are rapidly flashing 
coloured lights (green, red, yellow, blue, green, yellow, red). I am 
attending to them and they are not so brief that I am unaware of them.7 
Yet I fail to judge that ‘there was a blue light’. One possibility is that 
BLUE was not encoded in short-term memory and thus I was unable to 
report it. Another possibility is that BLUE was encoded in short-term 
memory, but it was interfered with by preceding or subsequent con-
cepts such as RED. Or finally BLUE was encoded but the information 
was lost due to decay. In all cases, it is a failure to maintain a concept 
active which explains the oversight. The same limitations also would 
presumably apply to comparable perceptual judgments about the 
                                                          
7  At very short durations the phenomena may be masked and not even reach conscious-
ness at all: Breitmeyer and Ogmen (2006); Kouider and Dehaene (2007). 
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dynamically changing shape of ripples on a lake, the topology of 
flame shape, and the number of forks on flashes of lightning.8 Overall, 
then, errors and limitations involving complexity and dynamicity do 
not seem to derive from domain-specific introspective processes. 
6. Conceptual Errors 
I have proposed that working memory places a limit on how many 
concepts can be formed/activated at a time, and thus how much 
information I can extract from an experience, and how long concepts 
remain active. Two other ways in which conceptual errors/limitations 
may occur include: 1. missing concepts, 2. uncertainty in using 
concepts.9 
6.1. Missing Concepts 
As Schwitzgebel points out there are many aspects of the character of 
emotions that I cannot decide upon. Even holding fixed working 
memory limitations there are many details of my emotion and pain 
experiences that I simply cannot categorize. The main reason for this 
is that I usually lack the appropriate concepts for delineating the 
details of these experiences. For example, I may not possess adequate 
concepts for distinguishing between annoyance and jealousy, and thus 
think that I am merely feeling annoyed rather than jealous. It’s not a 
matter of just possessing the words. It may come as a surprise to me 
when I realize that I feel jealous. I may have an incomplete concept of 
JEALOUSY, for example I know how people act when jealous, but pre-
sumably I do not know what it’s like to feel jealous until I actually 
experience it (and realize what it is I’m feeling). The same applies to 
feelings such as love, grief, awe, aesthetic pleasure, etc. I can possess 
the words for these without possessing a phenomenal concept for 
these feelings. 
Does the difficulty in acquiring concepts of certain emotions 
suggest that there is a domain-specific limitation here? In a sense it 
does, but this does not entail the existence of a faulty or more limited 
                                                          
8  Watzl and Wu (2012) also emphasize this point. 
9  A third type of conceptual error which I do not discuss here is the activation of incorrect 
concepts. For example, suppose I am exposed to something cold such as ice, but I have 
been primed to expect a sensation of heat and hence I briefly mistakenly judge that I am 
feeling heat. Again this type of error affects both phenomenal and perceptual 
judgments. 
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domain-specific process. As to why we may possess fewer concepts in 
one domain than another it is helpful to consider how we often acquire 
phenomenal concepts. An example is colour experience. I can easily 
acquire the phenomenal concept of turquoise because someone can 
point to something that is turquoise, such as a turquoise opal. By 
doing this I am provided with a phenomenal sample of turquoise. I 
learn what it is like to experience it, how it relates to other colours 
(e.g. that it is a greenish-blue) and I can then identify it again on other 
occasions. 
Emotions on the other hand are more difficult to learn presumably 
because it is more difficult to provide a phenomenal sample. Someone 
cannot simply flick a switch and turn on my feeling of tenderness. 
They may set up the appropriate situation or show a scene from a 
movie where characters are portraying this feeling, but it is not 
guaranteed that I will thereby feel tenderness, and certainly not as 
reliably as I can be made to experience turquoise. Thus it seems that I 
will be unlikely to acquire concepts for the myriad affective subtleties, 
like anger 22 versus anger 23, as I can potentially do for colour 
experience. This does not show that there is a unique process for 
making judgments about emotions that is less reliable or more limited 
than for making judgments about colours. Rather, there is a non-
introspective limitation here. If colours were as difficult to manipulate 
as emotions, and as unstable, then they would be just as difficult to 
learn. 
6.2. Uncertainty in Using Concepts 
On other occasions, I possess the appropriate concept, and it is 
currently activated, but I am uncertain as to how to employ it. An 
example, given by Schwitzgebel, is in making judgments about visual 
imagery. Schwitzgebel asks if you can give medium-level details of 
your mental image of a house (Schwitzgebel, 2011, Chapter 3). How 
clear is it? How detailed is it? How stable is it? Your uncertainty in 
answering these questions suggests that you are an unreliable 
introspector.10 
                                                          
10  Contrary to Schwitzgebel’s claim, Pearson, Rademaker and Tong (2011) used an 
ingenious binocular rivalry task to show evidence that subjects are reliable at judging 
the vividness of their mental images. Using the same paradigm, Rademaker and Pearson 
(2012) found that subjects can improve this metacognitive ability with training. My 
thanks to Helen Yetter-Chappell for pointing me towards these studies. 
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Even though we presumably do get such questions wrong on 
occasion, there are analogous examples of perceptual judgments 
where there are similar amounts of uncertainty. For example: ‘Where 
exactly does that haystack begin and end?’ ‘How large is that bus?’ 
‘How bushy is that tree?’ These are difficult questions to answer. Yet 
this does not show that my perception of haystacks, buses, or trees is 
unreliable, only that I am not always sure how to apply these 
categories. Of course, the instability and low resolution of mental 
images most likely makes answering many questions about them more 
difficult than many visual perceptions. 
7. Cognitive Dissociations 
Cognitive dissociations present a challenge to a domain-general theory 
as they provide examples of deficits in making judgments within 
specific modalities, while leaving general cognitive abilities intact. 
For example, visual associative agnosia is the inability to identify 
visually perceived ordinary objects such as cups despite intact visual 
perception (Farah, 2004). Subjects with this condition can also recog-
nize a familiar object as a cup if they are allowed to touch it, thus 
showing that the conceptual system is intact, and that the deficit is 
specific to visual recognition. Such neurological conditions suggest 
that there are domain-specific informational links between different 
sensory modalities and the activation of concepts in working memory. 
One particularly relevant example for the present enquiry is alexi-
thymia, which is a clinical condition which literally means ‘no words 
for feelings’ (Samur et al., 2013).11 It is characterized by a subject’s 
difficulty in describing emotions. For example, sufferers may not be 
able distinguish whether they are feeling angry, sad, or anxious, or 
distinguish whether they are feeling a bodily sensation or an emotional 
state, and they also may not be able to identify others’ emotions. 
Alexithymia is a challenge for a domain-general cognitive theory 
because sufferers have difficulties describing their emotions even 
though their attentional and working memory systems and other con-
ceptual abilities remain intact, thereby suggesting the existence of a 
domain-specific process. 
In fact, two types of alexithymia have been distinguished (Larsen et 
al., 2003). Type I is associated with a lack of emotional experience. 
                                                          
11  Thank you to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this case. 
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Since sufferers feel a blunting or an absence of emotions, this has a 
follow-on effect to the cognitive processing of emotions in general. 
An analogy here is colour-blindness (Lane et al., 1996). A subject that 
is colour-blind has problems identifying colour, but this is due to not 
experiencing them in the first place, not due to a general attentional or 
conceptual malfunction. Hence this form of alexithymia is not prob-
lematic for the current hypothesis. 
Type II alexithymia appears to be analogous to visual associative 
agnosia. It is characterized by no deficit in feeling emotions, but pre-
dominantly in identifying and describing them. This form of alexi-
thymia is associated with damage to the person’s corpus callosum and 
hence a disorder in interhemispheric communication. This suggests 
that there can be a domain-specific disruption between the experi-
encing of an emotion and the activation of a concept for the emotion 
in working memory. 
This is compatible with the present domain-general framework for 
three reasons: firstly, it does not entail that identifying emotions relies 
upon a special introspective attentional mechanism, working memory 
resource, or conceptual system, only that there is an additional 
domain-specific informational link (particularly in interhemispheric 
communication). 
Secondly, the existence of domain-specific processes does not 
invalidate the present framework because the hypothesis was that most 
errors can be accounted for by domain-general processes (not that 
there are no domain-specific processes which contribute to phenom-
enal judgments). This is consistent with domain-specific processes 
also contributing to the judgment as long as their role in producing 
errors in neurally typical individuals is relatively small. While I 
cannot conclusively prove that this is in fact the case, I think that there 
can be indirect evidence for this hypothesis. In particular, in account-
ing for the unreliability of different phenomenal judgments I have 
drawn upon attentional, working memory, and conceptual factors, as 
well as properties of the target phenomenal states such as complexity 
and dynamicity. There has so far been no need to posit any other 
significant sources of error in accounting for problem cases in typical 
individuals. 
Thirdly, alexithymia is also associated with a difficulty in identi-
fying others’ emotional states (a judgment about the world) as well as 
one’s own emotional states (a phenomenal judgment). Lane et al. 
(1996) present evidence that individuals with alexithymia have diffi-
culty in recognizing the emotions displayed by faces. That is, it is not 
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just a deficit unique to identifying one’s own emotional states, but in 
emotion processing in general. Goldman (2006) also reviews evidence 
that a deficit in feeling a specific emotion is paired with a deficit in 
recognizing the same specific emotion in others. This suggests that 
making judgments about one’s own emotions and those of others 
share underlying processes, which is a version of the domain-general 
thesis. Thus, even if evidence was found that these informational links 
were significantly unreliable in neurally typical subjects, alexithymia 
still does not provide evidence for a separate introspective process 
apart from processes involved in making judgments about the world. 
Rather it is consistent with the domain-general thesis. 
8. Against Introspective Scepticism 
In Sections 4–6, I argued that most errors and limitations of phenom-
enal judgments can in principle be accounted for by the domain-
general dimensions of attention, working memory limitations, and 
conceptualization. If true then this account undermines the process 
unreliability thesis. I provide reasons in support of the domain-general 
thesis in the next section. 
What about the statistical unreliability thesis? It can still be held that 
phenomenology is in general more complex, dynamic, and elusive, 
and thus we will always be less reliable at judging it than facts about 
the world. The statistical unreliability thesis is compatible with the 
domain-general account. According to the current framework, the 
greater unreliability of phenomenal judgments (if they are indeed less 
reliable) is typically due to properties of the target of the judgment 
such as complexity and dynamicity, or other factors such as a lack of 
expertise in making phenomenal judgments, rather than a fault in 
specific processes which produce the judgment. This can lead to 
statistical differences in the reliability of phenomenal judgments, but 
this uniqueness does not imply that the errors stem from separate 
domain-specific processes. 
Perhaps a type of scepticism can be based upon statistical 
unreliability. In this section I consider some motivations for holding 
the statistical unreliability thesis. I then present an argument for 
blocking a move from statistical unreliability to introspective 
scepticism. 
In my view, Schwitzgebel’s (2011, p. 136) claim that experience is 
almost always ‘gelatinous, disjointed, swift, shy, changeable’ is 
incorrect, especially when it comes to perceptual experience. For 
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example, my visual experience of desks, the sky, and trees are very 
stable. In general, however, the dynamicity of thoughts, emotions, and 
mental imagery is a point in favour of comparative statistical 
unreliability. 
Another consideration in favour of this thesis is the possibility that 
we are experts when it comes to making judgments about the world as 
social factors and biological survival depend upon this.12 Since we 
have far more practice at getting these judgments right perhaps we are 
more likely to attend more effectively and to acquire more fine-
grained concepts like expert wine tasters (Ballester et al., 2008; 
Solomon, 1990) than for untrained judgments about experience. 
Perhaps we can also chunk items of the world more efficiently and 
thus can make more accurate judgments about complex situations 
such as being in traffic in comparison to the patterns when one’s eyes 
are closed, just as chess experts are better at assessing and memorizing 
positions on a chess board than novices (Chase and Simon, 1973). 
Also there may be few negative consequences if we get details of our 
emotional phenomenology, visual acuity, visual imagery, and eyes-
closed phenomenology incorrect, and so perhaps we tend to be 
novices particularly when it comes to these experiences. 
This being said, judgments about sensory experience such as ‘the 
rose looks red’ are intimately related to perceptual judgments such as 
‘the rose is red’. In making both types of judgment, I attend outwardly 
to the rose and its perceptible properties. I do not shift my attention 
inwards to decide how the rose looks. Schwitzgebel (2012, pp. 34–5) 
makes a similar point when he discusses how we easily slip between 
judgments about our perceptual experience and properties of the 
world, and takes it as evidence for overlapping processes in making 
judgments. However, he does not mention the implication of this — 
that this is a reason for thinking that a large number of phenomenal 
judgments and perceptual judgments (in the veridical case) are hence 
equivalent in reliability. Furthermore, expertise in one would then be 
expected to entail an equivalent level of expertise in the other. Over-
all, then, the novice argument is another point in favour of statistical 
unreliability for some though not all phenomenal judgments. The flip-
side of this argument is that it should be possible (at least in principle) 
to train subjects to overcome these errors. 
                                                          
12  Thank you to Eric Schwitzgebel for suggesting this argument to me. 
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Assuming that the statistical unreliability of phenomenal judgments 
was sufficiently high (although this seems unlikely), one might hold 
that this justifies a form of scepticism in which one should mistrust all 
of these judgments. Thus it may be that a strong form of pessimism is 
still viable based upon their statistical unreliability. I think that the 
current account blocks the threat of scepticism based upon statistical 
unreliability by providing criteria for distinguishing between reliable 
and unreliable phenomenal judgments. 
The proposal is that identifying the dimensions involved in making 
phenomenal errors vindicates the apparently trustworthy cases of 
phenomenal judgments such as foveal colour judgments, knowing that 
I am in intense pain, etc. by showing why they are so often correct. 
These highly trustworthy, virtually undoubtable judgments are 
characterized by the stability and high intensity of the experience, and 
the high degree of attentiveness at the time of the judgment, as well as 
the possession of appropriate concepts. 
This enables us to locate the reliability of a particular phenomenal 
judgment in reliability space (Figure 1). I will provide an example 
using wine tasting judgments (for the sake of simplicity I do not 
include all of the relevant factors in the figure).13 For example, the 
judgments of a wine taster who is inattentive and with a low degree of 
conceptual adequacy would be located at A (e.g. an inattentive novice 
taster); inattentive but high conceptual adequacy at B (e.g. an 
inattentive expert taster); attentive but low conceptual adequacy at C 
(e.g. an attentive novice taster); and attentive and high conceptual 
adequacy at D (e.g. an attentive expert taster).14 As there are 
principled criteria for distinguishing between reliable and unreliable 
phenomenal judgments, there is no reason to doubt judgments that 
reside in a superior position in reliability space, thus undermining the 
potential slide into introspective scepticism. 
A response to this account by the pessimist is to move the pessi-
mism to a higher level and ask: how do you know that you are in a 
                                                          
13  Errors due to the complexity or dynamicity of the experience can be incorporated into 
this simplified reliability space as these tend to cause a failure of the appropriate con-
cepts to either be activated or maintained in working memory. A more explanatorily 
adequate figure would also include these factors. 
14  In a study by Solomon (1990) it was found that wine experts are better at picking the 
odd wine out of three glasses of wine than novices, which suggests that it is the 
possession of concepts, rather than terminology, that differentiates experts from novices 
(see also Ballester et al., 2008). 
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situation where you are being appropriately attentive and have 
adequate concepts, etc.? However, this question also applies to per-
ception, reasoning, and mathematics so one cannot be a higher-order 
pessimist about phenomenal judgments without also generalizing this 
pessimism to these other domains. This argument works 
independently of the truth of the domain-general thesis. Suppose 
evidence arose that there are multiple domain-specific attentional 
mechanisms. Nevertheless, by identifying a type of error as 
attentional, this provides criteria for deciding if a phenomenal judg-
ment is likely to be erroneous. 
 
Figure 1. Reliability space for phenomenal judgments on the dimensions of 
attentiveness and conceptual adequacy. (A) Low attentiveness and low 
conceptual adequacy, (B) low attentiveness and high conceptual 
adequacy, (C) high attentiveness and low conceptual adequacy, (D) high 
attentiveness and high conceptual adequacy. 
9. The Case for the Domain-General Thesis 
The primary aim of the paper was to argue against the process 
unreliability thesis which holds that phenomenal judgments are 
unreliable due to faulty domain-specific processes. The strategy was 
to argue that problem cases for phenomenal judgments can either be 
discounted as non-errors or accounted for by domain-general factors 
such as attention, working memory, and conceptualization. Thus it is 
not that mechanisms involved in making phenomenal judgments are 
unreliable per se, but any judgment in which there are attentional and 
conceptual errors or working memory limits are exceeded, including 
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phenomenal, perceptual, mathematical, and rational judgments. If true 
then this account undermines the process unreliability thesis. 
Furthermore, this would significantly limit the scope of pessimism 
about phenomenal judgments because perceptual judgments would 
also suffer from the same errors and limitations as phenomenal judg-
ments. One outcome of the current account, if true, is that theorists 
who claim that phenomenal judgments are generally unreliable must 
mean that they are unreliable in terms of overall numbers, not that the 
underlying processes are unreliable. If they mean that the underlying 
processes themselves are generally unreliable, then the claim would 
overgeneralize, such that perceptual and intellectual judgments would 
also be generally unreliable. This is presumably an outcome that no 
one wants. 
Should we accept the domain-general account of errors and limita-
tions? As it is an empirical hypothesis it is always open to defeating 
evidence, so I cannot claim to have proved the hypothesis here. I do, 
however, think that it is sufficiently probable enough to warrant 
assenting to this thesis over a domain-specific account. The reasons in 
favour of the present thesis are: 
(1) Attentional distraction between different modalities, suggesting 
that there is a single focus of attention. If there was a separate 
introspective attention then I should be able to attend to my 
thoughts and the world simultaneously without distraction. 
(2) A working memory capacity-limit of approximately four chunks 
for many different domains (Cowan, 2001) (including stereo-
typically introspective cases), as well as direct empirical evidence 
for a single capacity across sensory modalities (Saults and 
Cowan, 2007). 
(3) Phenomenal judgments and perceptual judgments are subject to 
the same types of conceptual errors. 
(4) That most errors and limitations for neurally typical individuals 
stem from a domain-general system is compatible with cognitive 
dissociations such as alexithymia. 
(5) The domain-general framework is more parsimonious than 
positing multiple domain-specific systems that are responsible for 
the same types of errors and limitations. Why posit special types 
of attention, working memory capacity, and conceptualization 
when a single system could perform the same functions? This 
arguably shifts the burden of proof onto the proponent of the 
process unreliability thesis. 
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At the very least this paper blocks an argument for the process 
unreliability thesis. However, I claim that we can draw a stronger 
conclusion than this. 
The above reasons do not prove the hypothesis, but I think that they 
provide sufficient support, in conjunction with being the simpler 
hypothesis, for provisionally accepting the domain-general thesis over 
the process unreliability thesis barring evidence arising to the 
contrary. 
The present account also provides systematic criteria for 
distinguishing reliable from unreliable phenomenal judgments, which 
blocks the argument for general introspective scepticism based upon 
statistical unreliability. By limiting the scope of pessimism, this paper 
also contributes to the wider project of defending the possibility of 
reliable first-person methods for investigating conscious experience. 
The specific details of what such first-person methods might consist in 
is a topic for another time. 
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